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LGBT Discrimination as Religious Discrimination: 





Discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons is a common 
occurrence.1 It arises within the context of public accommodations, housing, employment, and 
virtually every other aspect of public life.2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin,3 and the 
Supreme Court has recently held that “sex” encompasses LGBT status.4 In so doing, the Court 
overruled approximately fifty years of case law, interpreted “sex” irregularly, ignored legislative 
history, and bypassed the traditional legislative process.5 It also granted key civil rights to millions 
of deserving Americans.6 What the Court did not do, however, was address whether this new 
requirement will apply to religious institutions. 
This article proposes that courts treat LGBT discrimination as religious discrimination. This is 
because such a construction would prohibit most forms of LGBT employment discrimination, 
 
* J.D., 2020, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. An earlier version of this paper was awarded 
Third Prize in the John S. Welch Legal Writing Competition. 
1 This article uses the term “LGBT” for brevity but includes queer, questioning, intersex, asexual, and gender non-
conforming persons by implication. See generally Matthew Bell, Take a Letter: The Story of an Escalating Acronym, 
SPECTATOR (Nov. 5, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/11/why-be-lgbt-when-you-can-be-
lgbtiqcapgngfnba/ (discussing the complexity of the term “LGBT”). The term “LGBT status” includes sexual 
orientation, gender identity, and other non-heterosexual forms of sexual and gender expression. See LGBTQ 
Glossary, JOHNS HOPKINS U., https://studentaffairs.jhu.edu/lgbtq/education/glossary/ (last visited May 30, 2020). 
2 This article focuses on equal employment opportunity. See generally Christy Mallory & Brad Sears, Evidence of 
Discrimination in Public Accommodations Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, An Analysis of 
Complaints Filed with State Enforcement Agencies, 2008–2014, WILLIAMS INST. 2, 7 (2016), 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Public-Accommodations-Discrimination-Complaints-
2008-2014.pdf (public accommodations and housing). 
3 Questions and Answers: Religious Discrimination in the Workplace, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N 
(Jan. 31, 2011), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_religion.html [hereinafter, EEOC Religious Discrimination 
Q&A]. 
4 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1753 (2020). 
5 Id. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
6 Id. at 1837 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
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while also preserving Title VII’s religious institution exception.7 Part I describes the history of 
LGBT discrimination, surveys the provisions of Title VII, and documents problems with 
interpreting “sex” to include LGBT status. Part II argues that LGBT status falls within the 
definition of religion, because LGBT status entails sincere belief about important aspects of life.8 
Part II also describes constitutional issues that would be avoided through this construction, and 
policy reasons that weigh in favor of prohibiting LGBT discrimination while still accommodating 
religious persons. This article concludes that treating LGBT discrimination as religious 
discrimination—though unorthodox—effectively balances the interests of both religious groups 
and LGBT workers. As such, courts should adopt this interpretation. 
I. THE LGBT DISCRIMINATION PROBLEM 
LGBT persons have long suffered from discrimination. Title VII was enacted to prohibit 
various forms of employment discrimination, but the statute does not expressly prohibit LGBT 
discrimination. Many courts and commentators have attempted to shoehorn LGBT status into Title 
VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination, but, until recently, this view had not been widely adopted, 
and it does not effectively balance LGBT and religious interests. 
 
7 This exception permits religious institutions to discriminate on the basis of religion even with respect to non-
religious personnel, such as janitors, secretaries, or accountants. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2018) (stating that 
Title VII “shall not apply to . . . a religious [entity] with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular 
religion to perform work connected with the [entity’s] activities”); see also EEOC Religious Discrimination Q&A, 
supra note 3. Preserving this exception would allow religious institutions, such as the Catholic Church, or the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and its affiliates, to continue discriminating against LGBT job 
applicants. Secular businesses with religious motivations, such as Chick-fil-A or Hobby Lobby, would not be 
protected. Alternatively, the Supreme Court could engraft a “religious institution” exception onto the LGBT prong of 
sex discrimination under Title VII. But such an exception would be conjured entirely out of whole cloth. Compare 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (religious institution exception), with id. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (lack of a similar exception 
in Title VII for sex discrimination). 
8 It is important to note that LGBT status generally does not entail choice, however. Scientific research instead 
indicates that LGBT status results from complex interactions between genetics, development, upbringing, and other 
environmental forces. Nonetheless, just as an individual may believe in his or her existence while such existence 
remains objectively verifiable, an LGBT individual may harbor sincere beliefs regarding the objective fact of his or 
her LGBT status. See, e.g., Jay Michaelson, Chaos, Law, and God: The Religious Meanings of Homosexuality, 15 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 41, 57 n.63 (2008) (compiling sources discussing the genetic and developmental causes of 
LGBT behavior); Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1467, 1481–82 n.62 
(2000) (same). But see High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(assuming that LGBT status involves choice); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(same); Brandon Ambrosino, I Wasn’t Born This Way. I Choose to Be Gay., NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 28, 2014), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/116378/macklemores-same-love-sends-wrong-message-about-being-gay (arguing 
that some individuals exercise control over their sexual identities). 
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A. History of LGBT Discrimination 
1. History of Persecution 
Non-heterosexual behavior has been observed in various species, and it stretches back 
thousands of years in human beings.9 LGBT persecution stretches back just as far.10 In the United 
States during the 1600s and 1700s, LGBT persons were generally isolated, marginalized, and 
ostracized.11 During that time, non-heterosexual behaviors were criminalized, and “sodomy” was 
punishable by death.12 During the 1800s, LGBT behaviors were often condemned as immoral, and 
derogatory terms for LGBT persons gained popularity.13 As the study of psychology developed 
during the early-1900s, LGBT behaviors were classified alongside disorders like schizophrenia 
and depression, and LGBT persons were frequently “treated” via electroshock therapy, 
lobotomization, castration, and institutionalization.14 LGBT persons were likewise targeted, 
scapegoated, and persecuted during the mid-1900s, both in foreign countries and in the United 
States.15 
 
9 See, e.g., Ludek Bartoš & Jana Holečková, Exciting ungulates: male-male mounting in fallow, white-tailed and red 
deer, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOUR IN ANIMALS: AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE 154 (Volker Sommer & Paul L. 
Vasey eds., 2006); see also Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Wash. 1977) (LGBT 
proclivities stretch back to “Biblical times”). 
10 See, e.g., David F. Greenberg & Marcia H. Bystryn, Christian Intolerance of Homosexuality, 88 AM. J. SOC. 515 
(1982) (describing Christianity’s traditionally intolerant attitudes toward LGBT behavior); Amy Richlin, Not Before 
Homosexuality: The Materiality of the Cinaedus and the Roman Law Against Love Between Men, 3 J. HIST. 
SEXUALITY 523 (1993) (anti-LGBT sentiments in the Roman Empire). Some societies have been more accepting of 
LGBT behavior, however. See Richard J. Hoffman, Some Cultural Aspects of Greek Male Homosexuality, 5 J. 
HOMOSEXUALITY 217 (1980) (ancient Greece). 
11 See, e.g., SHERRY WOLF, SEXUALITY AND SOCIALISM: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THEORY OF LGBT LIBERATION 36 
(2009). 
12 I. Bennett Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 8–9 (2008); Louis Crompton, 
Homosexuals and the Death Penalty in Colonial America, 1 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 277 (1976). Sodomy was not fully 
decriminalized until 2003. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
13 See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the “Civil Union”/“Marriage” Distinction, 41 
CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1459 (2009); Vern L. Bullough & Martha Voght, Homosexuality and Its Confusion with the 
‘Secret Sin’ in Pre-Freudian America, 18 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 143, 145 (1973). 
14 Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1555 n.21 (1993). 
15 See, e.g., id. at 1565–67 (describing the application of McCarthyism to LGBT persons); Erwin J. Haeberle, 
Swastika, Pink Triangle and Yellow Star–The Destruction of Sexology and the Persecution of Homosexuals in Nazi 
Germany, 17 J. SEX. RES. 270 (1981) (Nazi persecution of LGBT persons); see also Exec. Order No. 10,450, 18 
Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apr. 27, 1953) (banning individuals guilty of “sexual perversion” from the federal service). 
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2. Modern Developments 
Today, more than  11 million Americans identify as LGBT, which is approximately 4.5% of 
the population.16 LGBT rights have evolved since the early-1900s, but LGBT discrimination is 
still a common occurrence.17 The LGBT civil rights movement in the United States began in 
earnest after World War II and was buoyed by the African American and women’s civil rights 
movements.18 In 1958, the Supreme Court granted some legitimacy to the movement when it held 
that an LGBT publication was not obscene and thus fell within the protections of the First 
Amendment.19 During the 1960s and 1970s, numerous demonstrations took place, such as gay 
pride marches and the Stonewall riots, where LGBT persons resisted police raids on gay bars.20 
LGBT issues gained greater exposure during the 1980s and 1990s, as public attention focused on 
AIDS, HIV, and the military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy.21 In 2015, after several incremental 
gains for LGBT rights, the Supreme Court announced the legalization of same-sex marriage in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, declaring that “[t]he Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach.”22 
Despite these advancements, LGBT discrimination remains a pressing issue. In the workplace, 
LGBT persons are often passed over for vacancies; they receive unequal pay and undeservedly 
poor performance evaluations; they are harassed; they are retaliated against; and they suffer from 
various other adverse employment actions because of their LGBT status.23 States that 
independently protect LGBT status receive thousands of LGBT discrimination claims each year, 
 
16 E.g., Daniel Trotta, Some 4.5 Percent of U.S. Adults Identify as LGBT: Study, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2019, 4:19 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lgbt/some-4-5-percent-of-u-s-adults-identify-as-lgbt-study-
idUSKCN1QM2L6. 
17 See, e.g., Jane Spade & Craig Willse, Confronting the Limits of Gay Hate Crimes Activism: A Radical Critique, 21 
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 38 (2000).  
18 See Carbado, supra note 8, at 1478–79. 
19 One, Inc. v. Olesen, 335 U.S. 371, 371 (1958). The Court has not been universally sympathetic to LGBT rights, 
however. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986) (LGBT behavior not a fundamental right). 
20 See, e.g., Bonnie J. Morris, History of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Social Movements, AM. PSYCHOL. 
ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/history (last visited May 30, 2020). 
21 Robert I. Correales, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: A Dying Policy on the Precipice, 44 CAL. W.L. REV. 413, 416–18 
(2008); Carol L. Galletly & Steven D. Pinkerton, Toward Rational Criminal HIV Exposure Laws, 32 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 327, 328–35 (2004) (public concern surrounding AIDS and HIV). 
22 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 651 (2015); see also United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
23 E.g., M.V. Lee Badgett et al., Bias in the Workplace: Consistent Evidence of Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity Discrimination 1998–2008, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 566–69 (2009). Incidences of discrimination 
increase when LGBT persons are considered “out” at work. Brad Sears & Christy Mallory, Documented Evidence of 
Employment Discrimination and Its Effects on LGBT People, WILLIAMS INST. 1–3 (2011), 
https://escholarship.org/content/qt03m1g5sg/qt03m1g5sg.pdf (37% of LGBT persons who were out were 
discriminated against, compared to 10% of LGBT persons who were not out). 
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and courts considering the issue in depth universally conclude that LGBT persons suffer from 
widespread employment discrimination.24  
In light of all this, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether Title VII prohibits 
LGBT discrimination.25 In 2020, the Court held that LGBT discrimination is prohibited by the sex 
prong of Title VII, writing that “[a]n employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or 
transgender defies the law.”26 While this decision represents a landmark victory for LGBT persons, 
the Court’s reasoning has been assailed on several fronts,27 and its opinion expressly declined to 
address the potential consequences for religious institutions.28 
3. The LGBT-Religion Conflict 
The debate surrounding LGBT rights is complicated by the issue’s interplay with religion. This 
is primarily because views about LGBT status are often motivated by religious beliefs.29 While 
some individuals regard LGBT behavior as harmless or merely biologically- or socially-deviant, 
religious persons—including corporate religious persons—often see LGBT behavior as inherently 
sinful or morally wrong.30 This is politically problematic, and it also presents legal issues with 
regard to Title VII’s religious institution exception and the First Amendment’s protections for 
religion.31 In addition, it is often difficult for courts to parse whether discrimination against LGBT 
persons is motivated by sincerely held religious views, or mere animus.32 Furthermore, LGBT 
 
24 E.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2010); JAMES REBBE ET AL., U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFF., SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BASED EXPERIENCE WITH STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS (2002), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02878r.pdf; see also LGBT People in the U.S. Not Protected by State 
Nondiscrimination Statutes, WILLIAMS INST. 1–3 (2019), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Equality-Act-March-2019.pdf (patchwork of state laws); Exec. Order No. 11,478, 63 Fed. Reg. 
30,097 (June 2, 1998) (federal employee sexual orientation); Exec. Order No. 13,672, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,996 (Mar. 31, 
2015) (federal employee gender identity). LGBT status is, of course, wholly unrelated to job performance. E.g., 
Sears & Mallory, supra note 23, at 1. 
25 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020). 
26 Id. at 1754. 
27 See id. at 1754–83 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1822–37 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also Part I.C.3. 
28 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754. 
29 See, e.g., Michaelson, supra note 8, at 68 (Christianity); see also Brenda L. Beagan & Brenda Hattie, Religion, 
Spirituality, and LGBTQ Identity Integration, 9 J. LGBT ISSUES COUNSELING 92, 93–94 (2015) (Islam and 
Judaism). 
30 E.g., Elizabeth Brown & Inara Scott, Belief v. Belief: Resolving LGBTQ Rights Conflicts in the Religious 
Workplace, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 55, 75–90 (2019) (describing corporate religious views); Chai R. Feldblum, Moral 
Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 70–72 (2006) (morality of LGBT status). 
31 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2018) 
(religious institution exception); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303–04 (3d Cir. 2006) (ministerial 
exception); see also Part II. 
32 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 770 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Courts are willing to 
parse whether religious views are pretextual, however, and whether religious entities’ actions comport with their 
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status and religious beliefs have troublesome similarities. For instance, accepting LGBT persons’ 
attestations regarding sexual orientation or gender identity is similar to evaluating the sincerity of 
religious persons’ beliefs. Likewise, the dignitary harm incurred by LGBT persons who are 
discriminated against is somewhat comparable to that incurred by religious persons who are forced 
to employ LGBT workers.33 Because there are legitimate interests on both sides, the fight between 
LGBT rights advocates and religious groups is sure to continue.34 
B. Overview of Antidiscrimination Law 
1. History of Title VII 
The United States has traditionally operated under an at-will employment regime.35 Few 
workplace protections existed prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was not designed with 
religious individuals or LGBT persons in mind, and instead focused on racial inequality.36 In the 
years leading up to the act, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence gradually evolved to protect African 
Americans from discrimination, a trend that mirrored the contemporary political landscape.37 The 
Senate was likewise slow to enact civil rights protections and it rejected hundreds of bills and 
filibustered the eventual Civil Rights Act for two months before eventually approving the 
 
alleged beliefs. Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts After Hobby Lobby, 
67 STAN. L. REV. 59, 62–64 (2014); see also Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria, 134 F. Supp. 2d 591, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(plaintiff asserted that beard was religious but shaved frequently). 
33 Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay People Should Have 
Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 135 (2006) (“What about the right of conservative Christians to ‘live 
lives of honesty?’ If they are ‘constantly vulnerable’ to forced association with gay people, will this not be ‘a deep, 
intense and tangible hurt’ to them?”). The harm to LGBT persons is likely greater, however, in part because such 
dignitary harms are generally accompanied by economic losses. See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 
853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
34 To illustrate the legitimacy of each side’s interests, imagine the case of a widow with fifteen or more employees 
who believes that hiring an LGBT worker will prevent her from seeing her late husband in the afterlife. Cf. Smith v. 
Fair Emp. & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 (Cal. 1996). On one hand, the widow’s beliefs may be pretextual. 
On the other, the LGBT worker’s attestations may be false. The widow will suffer emotional distress if she is forced 
to act contrary to her beliefs. The LGBT worker will suffer similar distress if the widow withholds employment and 
will also have to continue searching for jobs. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 711 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“Many good and decent people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith.”). 
35 See generally, Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. 
PA. J. LAB & EMP. L. 65 (2000). 
36 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17); 
Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C.L. REV. 431, 441–43 (1966); Craig Westergard, Note, You 
Catch More Flies with Honey: Reevaluating the Erroneous Premises of the Military Exception to Title VII, 20 
MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 215, 221–22 (2019). 
37 E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, https://www.nps.gov/articles/civil-rights-act.htm (last 
visited May 30, 2020). 
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legislation.38 President Lyndon B. Johnson then signed the Civil Rights Act into law on July 2, 
1964, marking the birth of what is still the most important civil rights statute in the United States.39 
2. Substantive Provisions of Title VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.40 To state a claim 
for discrimination under Title VII, plaintiffs must show: first, that the employer has at least fifteen 
employees; second, that they themselves belong to a protected class; third, that they are qualified 
to perform the essential functions of the position in question; fourth, that they have suffered a 
materially adverse employment action; and fifth, that the action was taken because of their race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.41 The act did not initially define the term “discriminate,” or 
the degree of causation necessary to state a claim, but courts have since held—and Congress has 
affirmed—that discrimination encompasses both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories, 
and that protected attributes cannot be adverse factors in employment decisions at all.42 
Title VII treats religion somewhat differently from race, color, sex, and national origin, 
however. To begin with, Title VII requires employers to reasonably accommodate religious 
employees.43 This requirement was introduced by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) in the 1960s and was added to Title VII when the statute was amended in 
1972.44 Title VII also contains two important exceptions for religious institutions. The first permits 
religious institutions to discriminate on any basis in employing “ministers,” a phrase that is 
construed broadly.45 The second permits religious institutions to discriminate on the basis of 
religion in all employment decisions, even as to non-religious personnel.46 
 
38 E.g., Cynthia Elaine Tompkins, Title VII at 50: The Landmark Law Has Significantly Impacted Relationships in 
the Workplace and Society, But Title VII Has Not Reached Its True Potential, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 693, 785–92 
(2016). 
39 Id. at 792–93. 
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Sex also includes certain related characteristics, like pregnancy. Id. § 2000e(k). 
41 See, e.g., Craig Westergard, Note, Unfit to Be Seen: Customer Preferences and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 34 BYU J. PUB. L. 179, 186–87 (2020). 
42 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k), (m)) 
(recognizing disparate impact discrimination and repudiating stringent causation requirements); Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 436 (1971). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Employers may escape this obligation by demonstrating undue hardship, which is a 
relatively slight burden. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). 
44 Susannah P. Mroz, Note, True Believers: Problems of Definition in Title VII Religious Discrimination 
Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. REV. 145, 147–48 (2005). 
45 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012). This exception is not 
actually contained within the text of Title VII but was instead developed by courts as a matter of constitutional 
avoidance. See, e.g., id. 
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 337–38 (1987). 
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3. Burden-shifting Framework 
Courts have also developed a burden-shifting framework for addressing employment 
discrimination claims.47 Plaintiffs must first make out a prima facie case by demonstrating the 
elements described above.48 The burden then shifts to employers to counter plaintiffs’ allegations 
by articulating at least one legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment 
action.49 Then, the burden shifts back to plaintiffs to prove that the articulated rationale is 
pretextual and to persuade the factfinder of the unlawful discrimination’s ultimate reality.50 
C. Problem of LGBT Discrimination as Sex Discrimination 
1. “On the Basis of Sex” 
The ordinary meaning of sex generally does not include LGBT status. “It is a fundamental 
canon of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking 
their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”51 Contemporary here generally means when a 
statute was enacted rather than when it is interpreted.52 Dictionaries from 1964 do not lend 
themselves to an interpretation of sex that encompasses LGBT status.53 During the early-1960s, 
LGBT persons were frequently isolated and marginalized, and many segments of society believed 
that they were psychopaths or criminals, making such a broad reading both unlikely and contrary 
to Title VII’s merit-promoting purposes.54 In addition, transgender surgeries did not take place in 
the United States until 1966, and so it is unlikely that sex would have been generally understood 
to include transgender status two years before it became a medically viable option.55 
Contemporary dictionaries are likewise unsympathetic to this reading of “sex.” The English 
Oxford Dictionary contains the following definitions of sex: “sexual activity, including specifically 
 
47 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
48 E.g., Carla A. Ford, Gender Discrimination and Hostile Work Environment, 57 U. S. ATT’Y BULL. 1–3 (2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2009/05/07/usab5702.pdf (coverage, protected status, 
qualification, adverse employment action, and causation). 
49 E.g., id. 
50 E.g., id. This framework differs slightly for disparate impact cases. See, e.g., Robert Beltont, The Dismantling of 
the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 223, 231–32 (1990). 
51 E.g., Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220, 227 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); Perrin v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). But see, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 352 (7th Cir. 
2017) (Posner, J., concurring) (“[I]nterpretation can mean giving a fresh meaning to a statement . . . that infuses the 
statement with vitality and significance today.”). 
52 E.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020); Sandifer, 571 U.S. at 227. 
53 E.g., Hively, 853 F.3d at 360–62 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (consulting various dictionaries). 
54 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination Argument for LGBT 
Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 335 (2017); Part I.A. 
55 See, e.g., Emily Skidmore, Constructing the “Good Transsexual”: Christine Jorgensen, Whiteness, and 
Heteronormativity in the Mid-Twentieth-Century Press, 37 FEMINIST STUD. 270, 272 (2011). 
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sexual intercourse,” as well as “either of the two main categories (male and female) into which 
humans and most other living things are divided on the basis of their reproductive functions.”56 
LGBT status may, in some instances, relate to sexual intercourse, but this is an alternative 
definition, not an ordinary one. LGBT status may also be fairly regarded as a category into which 
human beings are separated, but this categorization would be on the basis of sexual orientation or 
gender identity rather than reproductive functionality. Moreover, LGBT status is probably not one 
of the “two main categories” mentioned in the dictionary, given that the categories are expressly 
identified as male and female and less than one-twentieth of the population identifies as LGBT.57 
There is also evidence in Title VII’s statutory history to suggest that “sex” should be read 
narrowly. First, the statute enumerates other categories that overlap with each other, as in its 
prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race and color.58 Like race and color, sex and 
LGBT status substantially overlap with each other, and one could be said to encompass the other. 
But LGBT status is not included in the statute. This indicates that Title VII tends to spell out 
specific protected classes rather than implying some classes within others.59 Second, Congress has 
subsequently included prohibitions against discrimination because of gender identity and sexual 
orientation in other statutes, indicating that such classes tend to be enumerated alongside sex 
instead of being subsumed by it.60 Third, Congress has amended Title VII numerous times, 
showing that it is well aware of how to do so, and it has specifically amended the definition of sex 
to include other characteristics, such as pregnancy.61 Thus, the ordinary meaning of sex probably 
does not include LGBT status. 
2. Legislative History of Sex 
The legislative history of Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination is sparse, but the 
record does not suggest that Congress believed sex encompassed LGBT status.62 The historical 
 
56 See OXFORD ENGLISH ONLINE DICTIONARY (2019), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/sex (last 
visited May 30, 2020). 
57 E.g., Trotta, supra note 16. 
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018). 
59 See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 518–19 (1912) (expressio unius est exclusio alterius). 
60 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), with id. § 13925(b)(13)(A) (prohibiting certain entities from discriminating 
“on the basis of actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sex, gender identity, . . . sexual orientation, 
or disability”) (emphasis added), and 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(A) (prescribing heightened punishments for injuring 
“any person, because of . . . religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability”) 
(emphasis added). See also Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 364 (7th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., 
dissenting) (providing additional examples). While courts often allege that Congress may choose to use a belt and 
suspenders to accomplish its purposes, this is akin to saying that Congress purposefully employs surplusage. See, 
e.g., McEvoy v. IEI Barge Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 2010). 
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
62 See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986) (discussing Title VII’s relative lack of 
legislative history with regard to sex discrimination). 
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context of the sex provision was of women entering the workforce in rapidly increasing numbers.63 
In the early-1900s, about 5 million women were employed in the United States, accounting for 
about 18% of the workforce; in 1966, about 27 million women were employed, accounting for 
about 36%.64 Today, there are approximately 75 million women working in the United States, 
which is close to half the nation’s workforce.65 As such, there has been an increasing need for civil 
rights statutes protecting women. 
In the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy repeatedly called for civil rights legislation, but 
the bills that were introduced did not address sex directly.66 As such, Title VII did not originally 
prohibit sex discrimination, and the term “sex” was instead added in an amendment proposed by 
Representative Howard Smith, a noted opponent of the legislation.67 Commentators have 
questioned Representative Smith’s motives in offering the amendment, but modern scholars 
generally agree that such concerns are overstated and overshadowed by the influence of women’s 
rights groups.68 Once it became clear that the Civil Rights Act would become law, however, 
Representative Smith and other opponents of the act expressed concern that Title VII would require 
employers to favor African American women over white women, and even showed support for the 
provision.69 Thus, the history surrounding Title VII’s enactment shows that Congress was 
principally concerned with addressing discrimination against females, not discrimination against 
LGBT persons, when it added the term “sex” to Title VII. 
In addition, Congress amended Title VII in 1978 to specify that sex includes discrimination 
because of pregnancy and related conditions.70 Congress did not consider whether sex 
encompassed LGBT status during the lead up to either Title VII or this amendment, however.71 In 
fact, members of Congress have introduced separate legislation prohibiting LGBT discrimination 
in every session of Congress since 1973, save one—legislation that remains unenacted.72 From 
Congress’s repeated lack of consideration for LGBT discrimination and its deliberate amendment 
of the term “sex,” courts have generally concluded that Title VII’s legislative history does not 
 
63 Leo Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 305 (1968). 
64 Id.  
65 Mark DeWolf, 12 Stats About Working Women, DEP’T OF LABOR BLOG (Mar. 1, 2017), 
https://blog.dol.gov/2017/03/01/12-stats-about-working-women. 
66 See Jo Freeman, How Sex Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 
163, 166–68 (1991). 
67 See, e.g., Kanowitz, supra note 63, at 311. 
68 E.g., Rachel Osterman, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and the Public Think Title VII’s Ban on Sex 
Discrimination Was an Accident, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 409, 410 (2009). 
69 See 110 CONG. REC. 2583 (1964). 
70 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(k) (2018)). 
71 I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1168 (1991). 
72 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 54, at 341 n.73. 
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support the argument that sex includes LGBT status.73 When there are no indications that the 
statutory definition of a term deviates from its ordinary meaning, that ordinary meaning should 
govern unless there are persuasive policy reasons to depart from it.74 
3. Circuit Split and the Supreme Court 
Until recently, the Circuit Courts of Appeal were united in holding that the word “sex” in Title 
VII does not encompass LGBT status.75 This holding originated shortly after the passage of Title 
VII and has been reiterated numerous times.76 Courts adopting this construction have relied on the 
ordinary meaning of sex,77 statements of legislators pertaining specifically to women,78 legislative 
inaction,79 and policies favoring judicial conservativism, consistency, and predictability in the 
law.80 After the EEOC reversed its previous guidance in 2015, however, some circuits chose to 
follow its lead by reversing existing precedent.81 In the face of this emerging split, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in several cases addressing whether LGBT status implicates sex, which 
 
73 E.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985) (“The 
total lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment coupled with the circumstances of the amendment’s 
adoption clearly indicates that Congress never considered nor intended that this 1964 legislation apply to anything 
other than the traditional concept of sex. Had Congress intended more, surely the legislative history would have at 
least mentioned its intended broad coverage . . . .”); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661–62 (9th 
Cir. 1977) (similar); see also Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 1089 (1990); Powell v. Read’s, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 370–71 (D. Md. 1977). 
74 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 70 
(2012) (“One should assume the contextually appropriate ordinary meaning unless there is reason to think 
otherwise.”). 
75 See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, Statutory Originalism and LGBT Rights, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 63, 86 (2019). 
76 See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341–42 (7th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases). 
77 E.g., DeCintio v. Westchester Cty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306–07 (2d Cir. 1986). 
78 E.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749–50 (4th Cir. 1996). 
79 E.g., Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005). 
80 E.g., Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255–57 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017). 
81 EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 576, 579 (6th Cir. 2018); Zarda v. Altitude 
Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 132 (2d Cir. 2018); Hively, 853 F.3d.; What You Should Know About EEOC and the 
Enforcement Protections for LGBT Workers, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/what-you-should-know-eeoc-and-protections-lgbt-workers (last visited June 
23, 2020). Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971) (“The administrative interpretation of 
the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference.”), with General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 
141–42 (1976) (finding EEOC guidance unpersuasive), and Theodore W. Wern, Note, Judicial Deference to EEOC 
Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second-Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1533, 1574, 1549–50 (1999) (finding that the Supreme Court defers to the EEOC approximately 54% of the 
time, compared to 72% of the time for other agencies). 
11
Westergard: LGBT Discrimination as Religious Discrimination
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2021
 
 
were consolidated in Bostock v. Clayton County.82 In Bostock, the Court held that the text of Title 
VII alone shows that sex encompasses LGBT status —and that it does so unambiguously.83  
The Court’s analysis does not quite live up to this assertion, however. Instead, its argument 
boils down to a single example, where an employer fires one of two otherwise identical employees, 
a male and a female, both of whom are attracted to men.84 The Court first attempted a similarly 
situated analysis, reasoning that: “[i]f the employer fires the male employee for no reason other 
than the fact he is attracted to men,” it takes action that it would not have taken against his female 
coworker.85 Second, the Court reasoned that both the man’s orientation and his sex were but-for 
causes of the adverse employment action, and Title VII prohibits sex from being even a factor in 
the decision.86 
The Court’s reasoning is flawed, however. First, its similarly situated analysis changes both 
the sex and the orientation of the male employee —making it difficult to tell whether sex, LGBT 
status, or both were responsible for the adverse employment action.87 Second, its causation 
analysis assumes that sex and LGBT status cannot be disentangled.88 But that is not true. An 
employer that requires job applicants to check a box indicating whether they are LGBT may 
discriminate solely on that basis.89 And even though sex and LGBT status may be somewhat 
related, not everything that is related to sex is sex. Viewing sex as a legal cause of LGBT 
discrimination just because an employer is aware of an employee’s sex invites courts to do the 
 
82  Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020). 
83 See id. at 1737, 1743, 1749. The fact that courts had, for over fifty years, uniformly held that sex does not 
encompass LGBT status likely mitigates in favor of the opposite conclusion. Id. at 1832–33 (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting). At the very least, this disagreement shows that reasonable minds may differ on this issue, and that the 
text is therefore ambiguous. Compare Hively, 853 F.3d at 360–62 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (arguing that LGBT 
discrimination involves hetero-homo distinctions while sex discrimination involves male-female distinctions), with 
Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
197, 234 (1994) (arguing that LGBT discrimination is inextricably intertwined with traditional gender roles). 
84 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1762 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
88 See id. at 1746. 
89 Id. at 1758 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 360–62 (7th Cir. 
2017) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (conceptualizing discrimination against gay and lesbian individuals as discrimination 
on the basis of orientation instead of discrimination on the basis of sex). 
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same for other sex-linked factors, such as dress, appearance, or aggression.90 Where to draw the 
line becomes a matter of policy.91 
The ordinary meaning of the word “sex,” the legislative history of Title VII, the previous 
unanimity of the circuit courts, policies favoring stability and predictability in the law, and the 
constitutional separation of powers each mitigate in favor of holding that sex does not encompass 
LGBT status.92 But the reasons for prohibiting LGBT discrimination are also persuasive, and so a 
judicial remedy for LGBT discrimination may still be desirable.93 
Near the end of the Court’s opinion in Bostock, it briefly addressed religion: “We are also 
deeply concerned with preserving the promise of the free exercise of religion enshrined in our 
Constitution; that guarantee lies at the heart of our pluralistic society.”94 The Court wrote that the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the ministerial exception, and the religious institution 
exception may require different results in cases involving religious employers, but it reserved these 
questions for another day.95 That day is fast approaching. There are many good reasons to prohibit 
LGBT discrimination, but there are also many good reasons to preserve exceptions for religious 
employers.96 In light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bostock, the question then becomes: are 
there other, more nuanced means of providing LGBT persons with a federal remedy for 
employment discrimination? 
 
90 See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (dress and grooming); Janet S. 
Hyde, How Large Are Gender Differences in Aggression? A Developmental Meta-Analysis, 20 DEVELOPMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 722, 730 (1984) (finding that less than 5% of the variance in aggression between individuals is 
attributable to gender differences). Disciplining an employee for showing aggression should probably not be 
considered sex discrimination. Cf. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (difficulty of analyzing 
increasingly tenuous causal factors). 
91 Perhaps acknowledging this, the Court attempts to prop up its textual arguments with ill-fitting appeals to 
precedent. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743–44. One case the Court cites deals with straightforward sex 
discrimination; another is a per curium opinion that has since been obviated by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act; 
and the last is cited merely to show that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover 
reasonably comparable evils.” See id. at 1774 (Alito, J., dissenting). Inviting judges to decide what constitutes a 
“reasonably comparable evil” for purposes of Title VII likewise invites judicial policy-making — a role which some 
circuit judges have embraced. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 352–59 (Posner, J., concurring) (overtly embracing “statutory 
updating”); cf. John Sibley Butler, Homosexuals and the Military Establishment, 31 SOC’Y 13, 17 (1993) (“Where 
did [LGBT and other] people drink water during the days of segregation? If the answer is that they drank from the 
‘Whites Only’ fountain, instead of the ‘Coloreds Only’ fountain, then their oppression should be seen in a different 
historical light than that of black Americans.”); Part II (arguing that courts should interpret religion to include LGBT 
status because such an interpretation would preserve Title VII’s religious institution exception). 
92 See Part I.C.I; Part I.C.2. See generally Kira Fuchs & Florian Herold, The Costs and Benefits of a Separation of 
Powers—An Incomplete Contracts Approach, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 131 (2011) (benefits of separation of 
powers). 
93 See Part II.B.1. 
94 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754. 
95 Id.  
96 See Part II.B.1; Part II.B.2. 
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II. LGBT DISCRIMINATION AS RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
LGBT discrimination may be actionable under Title VII even if it is not treated as sex 
discrimination. This is because it is cognizable as religious discrimination. LGBT status meets the 
Supreme Court’s test for religion because it generally entails “sincere belief” about important life 
topics like sexual orientation and gender identity. Construing religion to encompass LGBT status 
also avoids conflict with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, reduces unfairness and 
inefficiency, and balances the interests of religious and LGBT persons alike. 
A. Religion Under Title VII 
1. Ordinary Meaning of Religion 
At first glance, the ordinary meaning of religion probably does not include LGBT status. LGBT 
status is not as far removed from religion as some may assume, however. During the 1960s, 
religion was increasingly characterized by “a new sense of freer social relations, particularly in 
sexual matters.”97 Dictionaries from this time define religion as “[o]ne of the prevalent systems of 
faith and worship,” such as Christianity or Islam, but also as “[h]uman recognition of superhuman 
controlling power” and “[a]ction that one is bound to do.”98 Such definitions of religion 
conceivably encompass LGBT behavior since LGBT persons often feel compelled to engage in 
actions consistent with their individual consciences and sexual desires.99 Modern dictionaries 
likewise lend support to a broad reading of religion as a “pursuit or interest followed with great 
devotion.”100 
In addition, several textual canons of construction support a liberal interpretation of religion. 
To begin with, race, color, sex, and national origin—as well as other protected attributes like age 
and disability—are broad, general categories.101 As such, the broad meaning of religion may be 
 
97 Daniel Bell, Religion in the Sixties, 38 SOC. RES. 447, 447–48 (1971); see also Note, Toward a Constitutional 
Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1069 (1978) (describing the “spiritual explosion” of the 1960s and 
1970s). 
98 Religion, THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 1029 (1964); see also Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. 
Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566–67 (2012) (consulting dictionaries). 
99 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 NW. J. L. 
& SOC. POL’Y 206, 212 (2010); see also Part II.B.2 (classifying LGBT status as religion would require sacrifice on 
the part of both LGBT advocates and religious persons). 
100 Religion, OXFORD ENGLISH ONLINE DICTIONARY (2019), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/religion 
(last visited May 30, 2020). 
101 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018). 
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inferred from its association with these terms.102 In addition, the Civil Rights Act as a whole 
prohibits irrational intolerance in various forms.103 The act generally prohibits making decisions 
based on non-meritorious factors within the context of public accommodations, housing, 
employment, education, and other areas.104 As such, a broad definition of religion likely comports 
with the rest of the statute.105 Finally, while Title VII originally defined religion to include only 
beliefs, this definition has since been expanded, such as when it was amended in 1972 to include 
“all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.”106 The definition of religion 
thus seems expansive, and so LGBT status may fall within the ordinary meaning of religion under 
Title VII. 
2. Legal Meanings of Religion 
While reasonable people may differ about whether LGBT status falls within the ordinary 
meaning of religion, LGBT status likely satisfies alternative definitions of religion promulgated 
by the Supreme Court and the EEOC.107 Before the 1960s, the Supreme Court generally required 
a nexus with deity for beliefs to be deemed religious.108 Several cases decided in the 1960s 
removed this requirement, however, and the Court now requires only a “sincere belief” regarding 
an important life topic. While preoccupation with God and organized religion sometimes still 
infects the inquiry into whether beliefs or practices are religious, this focus has not been sanctioned 
by the Supreme Court or the EEOC.109 
The first important case in this line was United States v. Seeger, which was decided in 1965.110 
There, the Supreme Court considered whether several individuals who believed in moral, cosmic, 
and spiritual principles, but who did not confess a belief in deity, qualified for a military service 
 
102 E.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 544–45 (2015) (noscitur a sociis). But see United States v. Barnes, 222 
U.S. 513, 518–19 (1912) (expressio unius est exclusio alterius). By this same token, of course, sex may also include 
LGBT status. See Part I.C. There are compelling policy reasons for interpreting religion to encompass LGBT status, 
however, because doing so would preserve Title VII’s religious institution exception. See Part II.B.2. 
103 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253; see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86 (1993) (whole act rule). 
104 Cf. Eskridge, supra note 54, at 331–32. 
105 See, e.g., Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 422 (2014). 
106 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(j)); Laura E. Watson, Note, (Un)reasonable Religious Accommodation: The Argument for an “Essential 
Functions” Provision Under Title VII, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 55 (2016). 
107 The law often uses terms in ways that are not quite ordinary. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. at 
1738–39; Smith v. United States 508 U.S. 223, 225 (1993) (criminal defendants who trade guns for drugs “use” 
firearms within the context of an enhanced penalty statute). As such, the Supreme Court’s definitional gloss for the 
term “religion” should be controlling. See infra. 
108 Compare Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (requiring religion to refer to the belief in and worship of a 
deity), with Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (rejecting this requirement). 
109 See, e.g., Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Mroz, supra note 44, at 172–75. 
110 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
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exemption.111 The Court first reviewed the evolution of conscientious objector laws, which 
initially applied only to “well-recognized” and “organized” religions with specific belief systems, 
but later evolved to encompass “personal scruples.”112 The Court then recognized the “richness 
and variety of spiritual life” and “broad spectrum of religious beliefs” found in the United States, 
as well as the “ever-broadening understanding of the modern religious community.”113 These facts 
led the Court to acknowledge that while some individuals may believe in deity, “others think of 
religion as a way of life.”114 In light of these considerations, the Supreme Court defined religion 
as “[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to 
that filled by . . . God.”115 Thus, beliefs and practices may be religious if they are sincere, 
meaningful, and important in an individual’s own scheme of things.116 
The second case in this line was Welsh v. United States, which was decided in 1970.117 The 
Court again considered the problem of conscientious objectors and held that even expressly 
nontheistic beliefs may be religious.118 The Court reasoned that religious beliefs “need not be 
confined in either source or content to traditional or parochial concepts of religion.”119 The Court 
also stated that so-called religious beliefs may be derived from “beliefs on matters of public policy” 
 
111 Id. at 166–68. The exemption did not apply to those raising “essentially political, sociological or economic” 
objections to military service because, the Court reasoned, such “judgments have historically been reserved for the 
Government.” Id. at 173. 
112 Id. at 171. 
113 Id. at 174, 180, 183; see also id. at 192 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“I would attribute tolerance and sophistication 
to the Congress, commensurate with the religious complexion of our communities.”); Kenneth D. Wald, Religion 
and the Workplace: A Social Science Perspective, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 477 (2009) (“[T]here is 
astonishing diversity to what people connote by the concept of ‘religion.’”). 
114 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 174; see also Charles C. Lemert, Non-Church Religion, 16 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 186, 187 
(1975) (acknowledging that religion may be conceptualized as one’s world view, ideology, value-system, or even 
culture). The Supreme Court also quoted one eminent theologian who defined religion as “what you take seriously 
without any reservation.” Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187 (emphasis deleted). 
115 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.  
116 Id. at 185; EEOC Religious Discrimination Q&A, supra note 3; see also Captain Drew A. Swank, Cold Fusion 
Confusion: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Incredible Interpretation of Religion in LaViolette v. 
Daley, ARMY LAW. 74 (2002) (discussing an EEOC decision holding that beliefs on cold fusion and other scientific 
topics were religious). Needless to say, the Supreme Court’s definition of religion is exceedingly broad. 
117 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
118 Id. at 335–38. While plaintiffs are not required to classify their beliefs as religious, see id. at 342–43, such 
classifications may still be viewed favorably by some courts. See, e.g., Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, Inc., 205 F. 
Supp. 2d 1014, 1022–23 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (discussing importance of white supremacist plaintiff’s subjective 
characterization of belief as religious). 
119 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339; see also United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1500 (D. Wyo. 1995) (“[C]ourts 
cannot rely on their perhaps biased and traditional ideas about what constitutes a religion.”).  
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or views with “a substantial political dimension.”120 Thus, religious beliefs need not be theistic or 
traditional and may even be somewhat political in nature.121 
Courts applying Seeger and Welsh have found various beliefs to be religious.122 For instance, 
the Supreme Court has indicated that Native American beliefs about sacred landmarks and 
religions like Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular Humanism qualify.123 Lower courts 
have found that beliefs pertaining to witchcraft, meditation, white supremacy, vaccinations, cold 
fusion, and other topics can be religious.124 Few courts have examined whether LGBT status 
qualifies as religion, but those that have have impermissibly focused on extraneous factors like 
history, ceremonies, and holidays.125 
Like the Supreme Court, the EEOC has adopted a broad definition of religion.126 The agency 
defines religion as a sincere and meaningful belief that pertains to ultimate ideas about life, death, 
or purpose.127 Such beliefs may be nontheistic, moral, or ethical.128 The EEOC has further 
 
120 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342. 
121 Other factors affecting the Supreme Court’s definition of religion likely include the Constitution’s guarantees for 
the free exercise of religion, equal protection, and due process of law, since a narrow definition of religion may 
establish certain religions over others or deprive religious persons of equal protection or due process. See, e.g., 
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871) (“The law . . . is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment 
of no sect.”). Constitutional considerations may thus compel a broad reading of religion so that the government does 
not favor some species of religion over others. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501–04 (1979); 
John C. Knechtle, If We Don’t Know What It Is, How Do We Know if It’s Established?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 521, 528–
30 (2003). 
122 See infra notes 123–24. 
123 See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 
495 n.11 (1961). 
124 Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681–82 (7th Cir. 2004) (atheism); Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 
931–32 (4th Cir. 1986) (witchcraft); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 213–14 (3d Cir. 1979) (meditation); Founding 
Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Scientology); Peterson v. Wilmur 
Commc’ns, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022–23 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (white supremacy); Doty v. Lewis, 995 F. Supp. 
1081, 1084–86 (D. Ariz. 1998) (Satanism); Sherr v. Northport-E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 
92–94 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (anti-vaccination beliefs); Swank, supra note 116 (cold fusion and other scientific topics). 
125 Sevier v. Lowenthal, 302 F. Supp. 3d 312, 321–22 (D.D.C. 2018) (declining to view homosexuality as religion 
because it lacks the “trappings” of religion, such as a comprehensive system of beliefs, ceremonies, and holidays) 
(plaintiff sought removal of LGBT pride flags from hallways outside Congressional offices); Church of the Chosen 
People v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (D. Minn. 1982) (declining to view belief in the validity of 
homosexual relationships as religion because belief system was not “comprehensive” and lacked history, literature, 
clergy, a wide following, and ceremonies). But see United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (religion is “[a] 
sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by . . . God”). 
126 E.g., EEOC Religious Discrimination Q&A, supra note 3 (“Title VII . . . defines religion very broadly.”); see also 
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2020) (“[T]he Commission will define religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as 
to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.”). 
127 Notice No. 915.003, EEOC Compl. Man.: Religious Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 6–
9 (July 22, 2008), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.pdf. 
128 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2020). 
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elaborated that beliefs or practices may be religious even when they are not affiliated with 
particular religious groups and when there are few to no other adherents.129 
Because of the broad and encompassing definitions adopted by the Supreme Court and the 
EEOC, LGBT status may be fairly categorized as a religious belief for the following seven reasons. 
First and most importantly, sexual orientation and gender identity are not far removed from 
sincerely held beliefs about other important aspects of life, such as the sanctity of marriage, fidelity 
to one’s partner, divorce, chastity, tolerance, and love.130 Second, it would be somewhat illogical 
for the law to prohibit discrimination against persons who believe that LGBT behavior is immoral, 
while at the same time permitting discrimination against persons who believe that LGBT behavior 
is moral and acceptable.131 Third, LGBT status often functions as religion in the lives of LGBT 
persons, shaping many of the activities in which they participate, their peer groups, and their 
worldviews.132 Fourth, LGBT status is often framed as a moral or ethical issue by anti-LGBT 
advocates, who contend that LGBT behavior is unnatural and harmful, and by LGBT persons, who 
contend that LGBT behavior is ordinary, benign, or perhaps even desirable.133 Fifth, even if LGBT 
 
129 See EEOC Religious Discrimination Q&A, supra note 3. 
130 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015) (LGBT marriage “embodies the highest ideals of love, 
fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family,” where individuals “become something greater than once they were” in “a 
love that may endure even past death.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 217 (1972) (similarity between 
“religious beliefs” and “lifestyle”); Feldblum, supra note 30, at 63 (recognizing certain “commonalities between 
religious belief liberty and sexual orientation identity liberty”). Construing religion to encompass LGBT status may 
be criticized as a definition with “no discernible or defensible boundaries.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 417 
(1989). Such a construction does not mean, however, that religion can be anything and everything. See, e.g., Eric 
Lode, Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1469, 1503 (1999) (discussing the fallacies 
inherent in slippery slope arguments). Religion includes sincerely held beliefs about particularly important aspects 
of life, and sexuality, sexual orientation, and gender identity pertain to the “big decisions in life that go to the core, 
essential aspects of our selves.” Chai R. Feldblum, The Right to Define One’s Own Concept of Existence: What 
Lawrence Can Mean for Intersex and Transgender People, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 115, 139 (2006). If there is a 
flaw in this line of argumentation, it lies in the broad definition promulgated by the Supreme Court. It should not be 
surprising, however, that the definition of religion is broader today than it was in 1620, 1790, or 1965. 
131 See Buonanno v. AT&T Broadband, LLC, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1080–86 (D. Colo. 2004) (company 
discriminated on the basis of religion by refusing to accommodate employee’s refusal to sign diversity policy 
requiring him to “value” homosexual coworkers); cf. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345–47 
(7th Cir. 2017). 
132 See, e.g., Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2017) (Pryor, J., concurring); Stephen Cox & 
Cynthia Gallois, Gay and Lesbian Identity Development: A Social Identity Perspective, 30 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1, 23 
(1996). 
133 Compare Bryan Fischer: Homosexuality is “Immoral” Based on “God’s Perspective”, HUFFPOST (Apr. 3, 2013, 
11:22 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/bryan-fischer-homosexuality-immoral_n_3007024 (asserting that 
LGBT behavior is unnatural and immoral), and Matt Slick, Are Homosexuality and Homosexual Marriage Moral 
Issues?, CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS & RES. MINISTRY, https://carm.org/homosexuality-moral (last visited May 30, 
2020) (same), with Daniel Cox et al., A Shifting Landscape: A Decade of Change in American Attitudes About Same-
Sex Marriage and LGBT Issues, PUB. RELIGION RES. INST. (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.prri.org/research/2014-lgbt-
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status is viewed as a social or political issue, beliefs on these issues are similar to traditional 
religious beliefs on how things “ought to be” and how individuals “should” behave.134 Sixth, if 
courts are willing to defer to the EEOC’s definition of sex in deciding whether sex encompasses 
LGBT status, or the EEOC’s guidance on other matters, they should also adhere to the EEOC’s 
broad definition of religion.135 Seventh and finally, because courts have traditionally been 
unwilling to second-guess whether beliefs are religious and sincerely held, they should also 
generally accept LGBT persons’ claims regarding the sincerity and meaningfulness of LGBT 
status.136 Thus, courts should treat LGBT discrimination as religious discrimination. 
3. Legislative History of Religion 
The legislative history of religion under Title VII is sparse and somewhat inconclusive, but it 
suggests that religion should be understood broadly. Before 1964, Congress considered numerous 
bills that used the word “creed” instead of religion.137 The definition of creed refers to a discrete 
set of formalized beliefs rather than to the broader principles entailed by religion, and so Congress 
seems to have intended Title VII’s definition of religion to be somewhat expansive.138 Like in the 
case of sex, there was little legislative debate over the meaning of religion or its inclusion within 
Title VII.139 The only clues as to the legislature’s conception of the term come from two defeated 
amendments, one exempting religious schools and corporations from Title VII and the other 
permitting discrimination against atheists.140 While the amendment dealing with religious 
 
survey/ (finding that 43% of Americans believe that intercourse between adults of the same sex is morally 
acceptable). See also Sonja J. Ellis, Moral Reasoning and Homosexuality: The Acceptability of Arguments about 
Lesbian and Gay Issues, 31 J. MORAL EDUC. 455 (2002) (framing LGBT issues in moral terms); Vincent J. Samar, A 
Moral Justification for Gay and Lesbian Civil Rights Legislation, 27 J. HOMOSEX. 147 (1994) (same). 
134 See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342 (1970). 
135 See Part I.C.3. 
136 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 771–72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Courts generally 
do not inquire into whether a belief is religious. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 132 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (“Determining whether a belief is religious is ‘more often than not a difficult and delicate task,’ one to 
which the courts are ill-suited.”) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 
(1981)); see also Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (“[I]t is no business of courts to say what is a 
religious practice or activity.”); EEOC Religious Discrimination Q&A, supra note 3 (“[C]ourts generally resolve 
doubts about particular beliefs in favor of finding that they are religious.”). Courts do not generally question the 
sincerity of religious beliefs either, though they are more willing to parse individual actions for consistency with 
alleged religious beliefs. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“Religious experiences which are as 
real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.”); see also Adams & Barmore, supra note 32, at 62–64. 
137 See Vaas, supra note 36, at 431. 
138 Creed, OXFORD ENGLISH ONLINE DICTIONARY (2019), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/creed (last 
visited May 30, 2020). 
139 Russell S. Post, Note, The Serpentine Wall and the Serpent’s Tongue: Rethinking the Religious Harassment 
Debate, 83 VA. L. REV. 177, 181 n.11 (1997). This is because the legislature was focused on remedying racial 
discrimination. See, e.g., id. at 180; Vaas, supra note 36 at 431–32. 
140 Post, supra note 139, at 180 n.10. 
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institutions may connote a more traditional view of religion—since LGBT entities were virtually 
nonexistent in 1964—it certainly does not preclude other conceptions of religion.141 Similarly, the 
rejection of an amendment limiting the protections of Title VII to theists may indicate a narrow 
understanding of religion, or it may simply indicate the legislature’s rejection of this view. Drawing 
definitive conclusions from the negative actions of legislatures is often a futile undertaking.142 
B. Policy Analysis 
1. Nondiscrimination Justifies Liberal Construction 
While construing religion to encompass LGBT status may be an unorthodox reading of 
religion, nondiscrimination justifies interpretive devices. The Supreme Court has long construed 
statutes to achieve beneficial policy goals even in the face of plain statutory language.143 Moreover, 
the Court has specifically construed Title VII to further the act’s broad remedial purposes, such as 
when it recognized disparate impact discrimination, when it recognized sexual harassment, and 
when it extended the latter doctrine to cover same-sex harassment.144 
Construing religion to prohibit LGBT discrimination constitutes sound public policy, because 
discrimination is unfair and inefficient.145 Discrimination is unfair for three overarching reasons. 
First, discrimination is morally wrong. This is because individuals are of equal moral worth and 
possess “inherent dignity that requires . . . respect.”146 Adverse employment actions based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity offend these dignitary interests because they disregard 
 
141 See Vaas, supra note 36, at 439–40. 
142 E.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518–19 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
143 See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 (1989); United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 
485–87 (1868) (holding that a sheriff arresting a postal carrier wanted for murder did not “willfully obstruct . . . the 
passage of the mail” because laws are to be construed to avoid “injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence”). 
While conceptualizing LGBT discrimination as sex discrimination rather than religious discrimination would 
implicate many of the same policies, such a construction would not preserve exceptions for religious objectors. See 
Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. at 1753–54; Part II.B.2 (discussing why these exceptions should be preserved). 
144 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78–82 (1998) (recognizing same-sex harassment); Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–73 (1986) (harassment); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–36 
(1971) (disparate impact); see also, e.g., Hart v. J.T. Baker Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 829, 831 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[B]road 
remedial legislation such as Title VII is entitled to the benefit of liberal construction.”). 
145 While a legislative solution to the problem of LGBT discrimination may be preferable, Congress has shown that 
it is probably too gridlocked to act. E.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, As Gridlock Deepens in Congress, 
Only Gloom Is Bipartisan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/us/politics/congress-
dysfunction-conspiracies-trump.html (describing Congress’s “near-permanent state of gridlock”). In addition, 
interpreting the meaning of the law is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,” and courts 
may be better equipped to respond to changing circumstances with detachment and objectivity. Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
146 Deborah Hellman, Discrimination: When Is It Morally Wrong and Why, 4 DARTMOUTH L. J. 3, 5 (2006); see 
also, e.g., Samar, supra note 133. 
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individual worth in favor of parochial conceptions of identity.147 Second, discrimination 
distinguishes between individuals on the basis of immutable traits that are disconnected from merit, 
and it is generally unfair to discriminate on the basis of factors that are not within a person’s 
control.148 Third, because distinctions based on other immutable, non-meritorious factors are 
impermissible, it is also unfair to single out LGBT status for exclusion from the protections of 
antidiscrimination law.149 
Discrimination is also inefficient. This is because, first, intentional discrimination is generally 
motivated by animus rather than rational considerations, and so it leads to suboptimal decision-
making by employers.150 Second, employees also make suboptimal decisions from a labor market 
perspective when they weigh the risk of suffering unwarranted adverse employment actions in 
deciding whether to seek new employment.151 Third, discriminatory employment decisions create 
emotional turmoil and uncertainty for both LGBT employees and bystanders, which decreases 
workplace productivity.152 Fourth, discrimination unnecessarily increases employee turnover, 
reducing opportunities for worker specialization.153 And fifth, discrimination requires employers 
 
147 See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 146, at 5–6. 
148 See, e.g., Michaelson, supra note 8, at 57 n.63 (immutability of LGBT status). Because people generally have 
some control over religious beliefs, it is more equitable to require them to sublimate anti-LGBT preferences than to 
require LGBT persons to repress their identities. James A. Sonne, The Perils of Universal Accommodation: The 
Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003 and the Affirmative Action of 147,096,000 Souls, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1023, 1034 (2004) (noting religion’s awkward placement in Title VII alongside attributes which are generally 
considered immutable). 
149 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018) (race, color, religion, sex, and national origin); id. § 12112(a) (disability); see 
also 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (age). See generally Sophia R. Moreau, The Wrongs of Unequal Treatment, 54 U. TORONTO 
L. REV. 291 (2004). 
150 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 21, 26 (1991) 
(describing various irrational assumptions underlying discrimination); Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful 
Discrimination Wrong: Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 169–70 (1992) 
(discussing irrationality and false beliefs). 
151 See, e.g., Efficiency in Perfectly Competitive Markets, KHAN ACADEMY, 
https://www.khanacademy.org/economics-finance-domain/microeconomics/perfect-competition-topic/perfect-
competition/a/efficiency-in-perfectly-competitive-markets-cnx (last visited May 30, 2020). 
152 E.g., Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583, 
1642, 1656–57 (2018). 
153 See, e.g., Robert J. Flanagan, Discrimination Theory, Labor Turnover, and Racial Unemployment Differentials, 
13 J. HUM. RESOURCES 187, 204–05 (1978) (discrimination increases turnover); Larry Alton, 5 Reasons Modern 
Businesses are Turning to Specialization, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2016, 11:58 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/larryalton/2016/12/20/5-reasons-modern-businesses-are-turning-to-
specialization/#273243624a29 (benefits of worker specialization). 
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to forego many of the positive effects of diversity.154 Because LGBT discrimination is both unfair 
and inefficient, Title VII should be construed to minimize these effects.155 
2. Balancing LGBT and Religious Interests 
While protecting LGBT persons from discrimination is a worthwhile goal, there are also 
legitimate reasons to protect religion. First, religious persons who sincerely believe employing 
LGBT persons is sinful suffer dignitary harms comparable to those suffered by LGBT persons who 
are discriminated against.156 Second, some religious beliefs are social “goods” which promote 
stability and independently beneficial behaviors.157 There are valid reasons for protecting even 
undesirable religious beliefs so that desirable beliefs may be accorded the breathing space they 
need to survive.158 Third, freedom of religion promotes the pursuit of truth, and inhibiting this 
freedom likewise infringes upon the breathing space needed for this endeavor.159 Fourth, the 
difference between attacking religious beliefs and attacking conscience is relatively small, and 
permitting the former could have unforeseen consequences for the latter.160 In addition, preserving 
Title VII’s religious exceptions would avoid direct conflict between Title VII, the Religious 
 
154 See, e.g., Craig Westergard, Haply a Minority’s Voice May Do Some Good: Diversity at the United States 
Supreme Court, 29 J. JUD. ADMIN. 174, 174 (2020). 
155 Furthermore, the costs of nondiscrimination are generally slight. See Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and 
Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 848 (2001). The costs of judicial administration for LGBT claims are unlikely to 
increase dramatically since courts already dismiss numerous LGBT discrimination claims each year and are 
experienced in administering Title VII. Any such costs would also be likely to subside as compliance increasingly 
replaces discrimination. 
156 See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 569 (6th Cir. 2018) (describing 
employer’s sincere belief that permitting an employee to “deny their sex” while acting in an official capacity would 
require complicity in “violating God’s commands”); see also Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018) (sincere belief that serving LGBT patrons would be sinful); MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 164–74 
(2008) (importance of respecting religious beliefs). Of course, the dignitary harm suffered by religious persons 
comes without the corresponding economic hardship that is incipient in LGBT discrimination. 
157 E.g., Brett G. Scharffs, Why Religious Freedom: Why the Religiously Committed, the Religiously Indifferent, and 
Those Hostile to Religion Should Care, 2017 BYU L. REV. 957, 959 (2018); Patrick Fagan, Why Religion Matters: 
The Impact of Religious Practice on Social Stability, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 25, 1996), 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/1996/pdf/bg1064.pdf (religious beliefs are correlated with strong families, 
marital stability, socioeconomic mobility, and physical and mental health, as well as with lower rates of suicide, drug 
abuse, alcoholism, and crime). 
158 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (“In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political 
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. . . . 
But . . . these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the 
citizens of a democracy.”); cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964). 
159 E.g., Scharffs, supra note 157, at 958. 
160 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 605 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“There is no doubt that attempts 
to aid [or attack] religion . . . jeopardize freedom of conscience.”); see also Scharffs, supra note 157, at 980–88. 
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Freedom Restoration Act, and the Constitution,161 and it would promote consistency within Title 
VII and other areas of the law.162 
While treating LGBT discrimination as religious discrimination would permit discrimination 
by religious institutions as to both religious and non-religious personnel, it would not permit this 
kind of discrimination by secular businesses. Religious institutions would remain free to 
discriminate on any basis in the employment of individuals who hold themselves out as “ministers” 
and teach religious doctrine as part of their job responsibilities.163 This is because the Constitution 
“protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments” 
and “prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”164 Religious institutions 
would also remain free to discriminate on the basis of religion in the employment of non-religious 
personnel.165 This is the primary benefit of construing Title VII to forbid discrimination against 
LGBT persons under the statute’s religion prong.166 However, this construction would not protect 
ordinary, secular businesses, such as public universities, cake decorators, etc.167 Courts have 
articulated a number of factors—including whether an entity’s purpose, transactions, products, 
services, ownership, financial supporters, and constituents are religious—which differentiate 
religious institutions from ordinary businesses, and these factors probably exclude funeral homes, 
marriage counselors, and similar entities.168  
 
161 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339; see also United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1500 (D. Wyo. 
1995). 
162 See EEOC Religious Discrimination Q&A, supra note 3 (ministerial and religious institution exceptions to Title 
VII); Scharffs, supra note 157, at 960–65 (describing religious exceptions in other areas of the law, such as the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
163 See, e.g., Katherine Hinkle, Note, What’s in a Name: The Definition of “Minister” in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 34 BERKELEY. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283 
(2013). 
164 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012); see also Feldblum, 
supra note 30, at 121–22 (“[T]he harm to the enterprise in having its inculcation of values to its members 
significantly hampered . . . outweighs the harm to the excluded LGBT members.”). 
165 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2018) (religious institution exception); see also Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding and construing this provision); 
Koppelman, supra note 33, at 134–35 (“[C]onspicuously religious discriminators are so likely to prevail in their 
defenses that they are unlikely to be sued in the first place . . . [and] there are unlikely to be huge numbers of 
them.”).  
166 Preserving this exception would require sacrifice by LGBT persons. 
167 See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (college passing over adjunct 
professor for full time position); see also Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018) (cake decorating business declining to serve gay couple) (public accommodations case). Limiting the 
exception in this manner would require sacrifice by religious persons. 
168 See, e.g., LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 226–27 (3d Cir. 2007) (summarizing 
factors); see also Amos, 483 U.S. at 329, 339. 
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Permitting religious institutions to discriminate against LGBT persons is unlikely to be 
received warmly by LGBT rights advocates.169 Likewise, forcing secular employers with religious 
mores to treat LGBT persons equally may be received poorly in religious circles.170 As the saying 
goes, “a good compromise leaves everyone unhappy.”171 Nonetheless, as one scholar put it, “[t]he 
great attraction of regulation-plus-exemptions is that it lowers the stakes and makes possible a 
legislative compromise that does not threaten the deepest interests on either side.”172 Viewing 
LGBT status as religion is admittedly an unorthodox interpretation that could alienate advocates 
on both sides; it does, however, make possible a judicial compromise that effectively balances the 
interests of both LGBT persons and religious groups. 
 
CONCLUSION 
LGBT discrimination is an ongoing problem in the United States. In the not-so-distant past, 
LGBT behavior was criminalized and treated as a psychological disorder, and LGBT persons were 
subject to medieval medical treatments, institutionalization, and even death. Today, LGBT persons 
are still discriminated against in the workplace. While Title VII prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of sex, courts have traditionally not read this provision to encompass LGBT status—for 
textual, constitutional, and pragmatic reasons. Treating LGBT discrimination as religious 
discrimination resolves many of these concerns. First, LGBT status satisfies the Supreme Court’s 
definition of religion because it necessarily entails “sincere belief” about important aspects of life. 
Second, treating LGBT discrimination as religious discrimination is less likely to implicate 
constitutional protections found in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Third and most 
importantly, preserving exceptions for religious entities provides a Title VII remedy for LGBT 
discrimination while also accommodating the deepest interests of religious persons. As such, 
courts should treat LGBT discrimination as religious discrimination. 
 
169 See, e.g., Michelle Garcia, ACLU, NCLR, and More Groups Drop Support of ENDA, ADVOCATE (July 8, 2014, 
4:23 PM), www.advocate.com/enda/2014/07/08/breaking-aclu-nclr-and-more-groups-drop-support-enda. 
170 See, e.g., Cynthia Brougher, Religion and the Workplace: Legal Analysis of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 As It Applies to Religion and Religious Organizations, CONG. RES. SERV. 6 (2011), 
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1809&context=key_workplace (“[R]eligious 
organizations that have religious objections to homosexuality object to hiring requirements that would conflict with 
these beliefs.”). 
171 E.g., Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will Employment and Just Cause, 
87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 66 (2008). 
172 Koppelman, supra note 33, at 135. 
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